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Abstract: in this paper, we examine the relative importance of external shocks in domestic 
fluctuations of East Asian countries  and  check if these  shocks  lead to asymmetric or 
symmetric reactions between the considered economies. To this end, we estimate, over the 
period 1990.1-2010.4,a structural VAR model with block exogeneity (SVARX model) relying 
on a comprehensive set of external shocks.We  firstly  document a risingimpact of these 
external shocks on domestic variables since the mid 1990s. Finally, real oil priceand U.S. 
GDP  shocks  have a significant impact on domestic activity  and lead to more symmetric 
responses, compared to U.S. monetary shock and MSCI Index financial shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
The Asian crisis in 1997-98 has highlighted the role of regional contagion in financial crisis. 
The  vulnerability of East Asian countries to these  regionalcontagion effectshas been 
explained by their high openness degree (Corsetti et al., 1999), as well as by  their 
interdependence (Kaminsky et al., 2003). This crisis has prompted these countries to 
strengthen their monetary cooperation on the regional scale  in order to improve their 
monetary stability. Thus, in the aftermath of this crisis, a first wave of initiatives to implement 
cooperative devices between East Asian countries occurred.
1 After an initial belief in the 
“decoupling myth” (Eichengreen and Park, 2008) mainly explained by the dramatic increase 
in intra-regional trade and the leading role of China in the region, the global dimension of the 
subprime crisis following the Lehman Brothers collapse has once again raised the issue of the 
vulnerability of East Asian countries to external fluctuations. In response to the global crisis, 
the authorities have strengthened their financial cooperation by signing an agreement 
officialising the multilateralisation step of the Chiang Mai Initiative announced in early 2009. 
These agreements created a $120 billion fund meant to prevent a liquidity crisis in one of the 
signing countries.
2
Several methods have been used  in order toassess  this issue. A first strand of research 
decomposes cycles into specific and common components. Using a tridimensional VAR 
between 1971Q1 and 1997Q2, Chow and Kim (2003) identify, in addition to country-specific 
shocks, global and regional ones in order to  check  to what extent each shock most 
significantly affects output fluctuations.
 
The emphasis placed on external shocks is understandable given some structural 
characteristics of East Asian countries, particularly their tradeand financial openness and 
questions their rising effort in coordination and policy harmonization on a regional scale. 
Therefore recent literature has put the emphasis on external shocks in the region. Indeed 
investigating the responses to these shocks can give an additional indication, to the unique 
analysis of domestic shocks, on the homogeneity degree between the area’s countries and on 
the convergence process of their policies. 
3
                                                 
1Main measures are the following: the ASEAN Surveillance Process in October 1998; the Economic Review and 
Policy Dialogue in May 2000; the Chiang Mai Initiative in May 2000 which established a regional financial 
arrangement under the form of bilateral swaps. 
2See for instance Aizenman and Pasricha (2010), Guillaumin (2009), Lombardi (2010) and Oh (2010) for the 
details of these agreements. 
3Global shock is approximated by the United States while Japan is used as a proxy for the regional shock. 
 Their main finding is that a monetary union would 
not be desirable in the East Asian area because economies are prone to country-specific – that   3 
is asymmetric – shocks. Some papers implement dynamic unobserved factor models. Results 
are mixed. Moneta and Rüffer (2009) find  –  over the period 1975Q1-2005Q3  –  that the 
degree of business cycles synchronization has increased since 1990 except for China and 
Japan. Oil prices and Japanese Yen-US Dollar exchange rate are among the main drivers of 
this business cycle co-movement while world activity and international financing conditions 
are less important. Lee and Azali (2006), over the period 1960-2000, find that county-specific 
shocks remain the main driver of output fluctuations except for Japan. 
A second strand of research  relies on structural vectorautoregression  (VAR)  models to 
identify the nature and the impact of external shocks on East Asian economies. Huang and 
Guo (2006) estimate over the period 1970-2002 a four-dimensional VAR including a global 
external shock modelled as a global supply shock. External disturbances are not only 
significant, but they are also positively correlated among East Asian countries suggesting 
their symmetric nature. Ng (2002) analyses three shocksin a tridimensional VAR for five 
Southeast Asian countries over the period 1970-1995. The identified shocks are the folowing: 
external, domestic (supply-related) and domestic (demand-related) shocks. The external shock 
is considered as a simultaneous combination of supply and demand external shocks. His 
results show a strong correlationof responses to these shocks – including the external one-
suggesting that these countries are suitable for a monetary union. Rüffer et al. (2007) develop 
VAR models with sign restrictions for nine East Asian countries and India over the period 
1979Q1-2003Q4. Their model aggregates different variables  –  accounting for monetary, 
financial, commodity prices and real shocks – as external factors exerting an influence on 
macroeconomic fluctuations. They find that business cycles are mainly driven by external 
factors. In order to study the importance of external disturbances as a source of 
macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging markets
4
                                                 
4His sample includes eight emerging countries whose six East Asian economies: Hong Kong, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. 
, Maćkowiak (2007) draws up structural 
VAR models with block exogeneity. His models encompass as external shocks the Federal 
Fund rates, the world commodity prices, the U.S. money stock, the U.S. aggregate output, and 
the U.S. aggregate price level. Over the period 1986M1-2000M12, Maćkowiak (2007) obtains 
three main results. Firstly, external disturbances other than US monetary policy shock explain 
a significant share of the variance of domestic variables in emerging countries. Secondly, US 
monetary policy shock amounts for less than 10 per cent of macroeconomic fluctuations in 
emerging countries. Finally, all external shocks tend to be persistent as their impacts increase 
over longer horizons.More recently, Gimet (2011) has studiedthe vulnerability of East Asian   4 
countries to international financial crises using a structural Bayesian vector autoregression. 
She compares two major crises episodes: the Asian crisis (1997M1-1999M12) and the 
subprime crisis (2007M1-2009M12). Her results show that the financial vulnerability of East 
Asian economies has decreased but responses to international financial shocks are 
asymmetric. 
One important shortcoming of these studies is that no one so far has engaged in a systematic 
examination of a comprehensive set of distinct external shocks. East Asian economies are 
indeed linked through a number of channels; and the extent to which economies respond to 
external shocks may vary depending on the nature of the foreign shock. 
To overcome this drawback, we define, in this paper, several external shocks in order to 
quantify their respective impact on East Asian countries. More precisely we address two main 
issues: firstly the extent to which the vulnaribility of East Asian countries can be attributed to 
external factors, and secondly which of these factors leads  to asymmetric or symmetric 
reactions between the considered economies. The external shocks include real oil prices 
shocks, trade shocks, a financial external shock, and a monetary external shock. The effect 
and relative importance of external shocks are determined using a Structural VAR model with 
block exogeneity(SVARX model) in which external variables are not affected by domestic 
shocks either contemporaneously or with lags. Such VAR models exhibit dynamic responses 
consistent with a priori theoretical priors linked to the open economy framework. In addition, 
as stressed by Buckle et al. (2007), the imposition of exogeneity permits the inclusion of more 
international variables in order to integrate the diversity of shocks hitting domestic 
economies, while reducing the number of paramaters to estimate. As a consequence, such 
model improves the quality of estimations, in particular concerning monetary policy reaction 
functions (Cushman and Zha, 1997). As the model assumes that the emerging market is an 
open economy, it is then possible to estimate to what extent macroeconomic fluctuations in 
the emerging market are caused by external shocks. Using this framework, we identify the 
nature and the weight of different external shocks affecting a sample of East Asian countries. 
Our sample covers the period from 1990Q1 to 2010Q4. However, in order to check if the 
rising liberalisation of East Asian economies since the mid 1990 has lead to a growing 
importance of these external factors and more symmetric responses,  we  replicate our 
estimations over theperiodfrom 1996Q1 to 2010Q4. 
The results of the paper show a rising impact of external shocks on domestic variables since 
the mid 1990’s. Moreover, oil price and tradeshocks have a significant impact on domestic 
activity, compared to external monetary and financial shocks. This finding suggests that trade   5 
channels are above all significant in East Asian economies and that these economies are less 
exposed to external financial and monetary shocks. Finally, responses to external real shocks 
are positively correlated, while responses to external monetary and financial shocks are less 
symmetric, revealing an economic integration process evolving faster than the monetary one 
in the area. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the methodological 
framework and discusses its main assumptions. Section 3 presents the results of the variance 
decomposition for the variables contained in the SVARX model. The dynamic responses of 
domestic variables to the different external shocks are analysed in Section 4. Section 5 
discusses on the nature (symmetric or asymmetric) of responses to external shocks. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Methodological Framework 
2.1. SVAR model with block exogeneity 
In order to allow more accurately for the effects of external shocks on East Asian countries, 
we consider the following structural VAR model with block exogeneity(SVARX model): 
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where ( ) 0 12 = s A  for each  p s ,..., 1 , 0 = . ( ) s t y − 1 is a vector of external variables and  ( ) s t y − 2  is 
a vector of domestic variables. ( ) t 1 ε is a vector of structural shocks of external origin and  ( ) t 2 ε  
is a vector of structural shocks of domestic origin.  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]' , 2 1 t t t ε ε ε = is a Gaussian random 
vector satisfaying ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 0 , = > − s s t y t E ε   and  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] I s s t y t t E = > − 0 , ' ε ε   with  I  the 
identity matrix. 
We consider four external shocks in order to better capture the external vulnerabilities of East 
Asian countries over the studied period. The vector of external variables,  ( ) s t y − 1 , includes 
the real oil price
5 (rBrent), the real U.S.GDP (U.S. gdp), the Fed Funds interest rate (Fed 
Funds) and the MSCI index
6
                                                 
5The real oil price is calculated as the Brent oil price divided by the world GDP deflator. We also have used the 
U.S. GDP deflator and the U.S. consumer price index. Results, available from the authors, are similar. 
 (MSCI). 
6Stock index calculated by Morgan Stanley Capital International (http://www.msci.com/) made up of 1500 
stocks in the developed countries. We use this world index but excluding the Japanese Kokusai Index.   6 
The first external shock focuses on supply shocks proxied by the real oil price. Indeed, most 
of these economies import raw materials for their industries (Cushman and Zha, 1997). 
Astheir growth heavily still depends on exports to industrialised countries, especially with the 
United States, trade shock is approximed by U.S. GDP shock.The thirdexternal shock takes 
into account the transmission of foreign monetary policy which depends on the openness of 
the capital account and the exchange rate regime. As East Asian economies have adopted an 
exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar or to a currency basket in which the weight of the 
dollar represents between 80 and 95% (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Ilzetzki et al., 2009), we 
may expect that domestic variables should be sensitive to changes in U.S.  interest rates. 
Finally, in these economies, there has been  a trend towards open capital accounts. In 
particular, these economies benefited and keep benefiting from capital inflows which turned 
out to be highly volatile as evidenced by the Asian crisis and more recently by the global 
crisis. This is why we also retain an external financial shock able to capture stress on financial 
markets and proxied bythe MSCI index. 
The vector of domestic variables,  ( ) s t y − 2 , includes three variables, i.e. the real output (
d y
),the domestic producer  price  index
7 d p ( )and the nominal exchange rate against the U.S. 
dollar (n
d). Introducing the exchange rate is justified by the nature of this variable, which 
constitutes an important transmission mechanism for any shock, as showed by Cushman and 
Zha (1997). 
The model is formulated separately for each country and assumes that East Asian countries 
are enough small that they do not alter world variables.
8
( ) 0 12 = s A
This assumption implies the block 
exogeneity restriction   for each  p s ,..., 1 , 0 =  which indicates that domestic shocks, 
( ) t 2 ε , do not affect the external variables in the vector  ( ) s t y − 1  either contemporaneously or 
with lags. 
 
2.2. Identification scheme 
The identification of the structural form requires imposing ( ) 2 / 1 − n n restrictions, i.e. twenty-
one here as we considerseven variables.The model implies restrictions of short and long runs 
                                                 
7We chose producer prices instead of consumption prices in order to avoid the difficulties linked to the presence 
of prices controls in many studied countries. Indeed, except Japan and Hong Kong, many countries in the region 
subsidize directly or indirectly oil prices (the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand), use prices 
regulation (China) or the two instruments (Indonesia and Malaysia). As a result, it is difficult to interpret 
consumption prices responses to oil prices shocks. 
8We have run Granger non-causality tests in order to check this hypothesis. Results are 
availableuponrequestfrom the authors.   7 
restrictions and exogeneity assumptions. Following Maćkowiak (2007) and Sato et al. (2009), 
we impose the following constraints. The block exogeneity restriction implies that domestic 
structural shocks,  ( ) t 2 ε , do not affect the vector of external variables,  ( ) s t y − 1 , at time t or 
s t − . We thus obtain twelve constraints. 
Regarding  the external block, we  assume that real oil prices are not contemporaneously 
affected by the three  others external shocks. We obtain three  additional constraints. 
Identification of the U.S. monetary policy follows the work of Leeper at al. (1996) in which 
the Fed Funds rate can respond contemporaneously to changes in the real oil price. 
Furthermore, the Fed Funds rate can also respond to changes in the real U.S. GDP (Christiano 
et al., 1999). The link between real and financial sectors is complex as stressedin Bernanke 
(1995), Bernanke et al. (1997) or Boivin (2002). These authors demonstrate that a shock on 
the real GDP affects contemporaneously the stock market index but not vice-versa. This link 
is also assumed for emerging markets in Sato et al. (2009).
9
2.3. Data 
Following this literature, we 
assume that (i)the real U.S.GDP is not affected by the U.S. interest rate and the stock market 
volatility and (ii) the U.S. interest rate is not affected by short term stock market volatility. 
Thus, we get three  additional constraints.Regarding the domestic block, we impose three 
long-run zero restrictions, as in Blanchard and Quah (1989), Clarida and Gali (1994) and 
Sims and Zha (1999), where: (i) a domestic demand shock has no impact on the domestic 
product and (ii) a monetary domestic shock has no impact on the domestic product and on the 
nominal exchange rate.We use SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations) estimation 
with the above block exogeneity assumption to identify structural shocks by imposing both 
contemporaneous and long-run restrictions.In order to take into account financial crises that 
have hit East Asian economies (Asian crisis, recent world crisis), we introduce two dummy 
variables: the firstone equals to 1 from 1997Q2 to 1998Q3 and 0 otherwise; the second one 
equals to 1 from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2 and 0 otherwise. 
 
We use quarterly data over the period 1990Q1-2010Q4
10
                                                 
9See, for a literature review, BIS (2011). 
10Source material is described in Appendix A. 
in order to include the main 
economic episodes which have characterized the integration process of East Asian countries 
(1997-1998  crisis, 2007-2008 crisis, setting up of financial and monetary regional   8 
agreements). The sample includes China, South Korea, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
11
Every variable except U.S.interest rate (Fed Funds) have been turned into logarithms. GDP 
data (or, if unavailable, industrial production data)  and producer price  index  have been 
deseasonalized.
 
12We first test the  order of integration for each variable before running 
cointegration tests.
13
3.  The importance of external shocks in  the variance of 
domestic variables 
Finally, due to the shortness of the data set in sub-periods, we set the lag 
length of the SVARX to one, as in Canova (2005), instead of applyingthe usual Akaike’s, 
Schwartz and Hannan-Quinn’s information criteria. 
 
In order to determine the ability of external shocks to explain domestic variables fluctuations 
atdifferent horizons, and the relative importance of each shock,we perform a standard 
variance decomposition exercise for the variables contained in the SVARX model. The results 
of thisdecomposition are reported in tables B1 to B.3 and B.4 to B.6 for the all-period sample 
(1990Q1-2010Q4) and the sub-period sample (1996Q1-2010Q4) respectively. 
Table B.1 presents the variance decomposition of the forecast error of (log) real GDP.The 
first four blocks of rows shows the fraction of the total variance of real GDP that can be 
accounted by each type of external shock, while the last blockof the table displays the fraction 
that can be explained by all external shocks. 
For all studied countries, except Indonesia, over a short-run horizon (1-4 periods), the all 
period sample shows that external shocks explain at least 11  percent of the real GDP 
variances. Japan and Hong Kong are especially sensitive to these shocks insofar as the latter 
explain respectively 58.8 and 36.8 of their real GDP variance. External shocks tend to be 
persistent as their weight in the real GDP variances increases with time horizon. The sub-
sample period  –  from 1996Q1 to 2010Q4  –  exhibits a clear increase in the influence of 
external shocks. More precisely, at the short-run horizon, these shocks explain more than 15 
                                                 
11Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam were removed from the sample because of the lack of data 
availability. 
12Census X-12 method. 
13In this respect, we have run usual ADF and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. We also have tested for structural breaks 
by using firstly Perron (1989) test with exogenous break dates. In that case, we chose 1997.2 as a break date: it is 
indeed after the second quarter of 1997 that the crisis develops in earnest (Rüffer et al., 2007). We also have used 
the methodology developed by Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Clemente et al. (1998) in order to test unit roots 
with endogenous break dates. Details of unit root and cointegration tests are available upon request from the 
authors.   9 
percent of the real GDP variances. At long-run horizon (16-20 periods), external shocks 
increasingly matter, confirming the persistence observed in the all period sample. Such 
evolutions are linked tothe increase in the openness degree in East Asian countries since the 
end-90s’.
14
External shocks exert a stronger influence on producer  price index (PPI) than on GDP. 
Indeed, producer prices are more prone to international influences than consumption prices. 
From this perspective, the high impact of external shocks on PPI partly mirrors the rising 
trend in the trade openness in many East Asian countries. Table B.2 suggests that the more a 
country is opened, the more external shocks exert an influence on domestic prices (see, for 
instance, Singapore and Hong Kong). In countries with lower trade openness, the increasing 
influence on external variables on PPI variance rests on trade specialization in manufactures 
exports (as in China, Japan, and South Korea).As for the GDP, external shocks exert a 
persistent influence on domestic prices. The sub-period sample does not significantly change 
the results. Consistent with the increase in the trade openness after the Asian crisis, the short-
run influence on external shocks increases in all countries except Indonesia.
Over this  sub-period sample, only Hong Kong exhibits a declining share of 
external shocks in the GDP variance. Such trend – that contrasts with the rise in its trade 
openness over the same period – may be due to the stabilizing influence of China after 1997. 
15
The influence of external shocks on the nominal exchange rates (NER thereafter) offers a very 
different picture in the two samples for the short-horizon (1-4 periods). Indeed, while in the 
all period sample external shocks account for less than 10 percent of the NER variances in six 
countries, the number falls to two countries for the sub-period sample. In other words, the 
influence of external shocks has risen  over the period 1996Q1-2010Q4.  At the long-run 
horizon, the two samples suggest a dramatic increase in the impact of external shocks. In the 
all period, we note that external shocks explain more than 25 percent of the variance in all 
countries. This persistence of external shocks is confirmed in the sub-period sample except 
for Singapore. The increase in oil dependence of the region seems to explain this evolution. 
Indeed, the relative importance of each external shocksuggests that East Asian countries are 
more sensitive to real shocks than to monetary and financial shocks. Interestingly, the sub-
period sample (TablesB.4 to B.6) does not qualitatively change this result.More precisely, 
Table B.4 shows that domestic GDP tend to be more influenced by real oil prices shocks and 
 
                                                 
14The area is characterised by a decrease of trade dependence on the US benefiting Southeast Asia and, though 
less so, the Asean. This intra-area trade shift is confirmed by (i) a strong dependence on Japan, China and, to a 
lesser extent, Korea and Singapore, and by (ii) a supremacy loss of Japan in favour of China on the regional 
level, between 1996 and 2007. See, for example, Zebregs (2004), Petri (2006) and Guillaumin (2009). 
15Indonesia is the only country in our sample exhibiting a declining trend in trade openness after 1998.   10 
U.S. GDP ones at both short- and long-run horizons. The impact of real oil prices shocks is 
stronger on PPI variances. In all countries, except China, this shock accounts for more than 20 
percent of the PPI variance at short-run. As suggested by its share in PPI variance at long-
horizon (16-20 periods), this shock is particularly persistent. The sub-period sample shows a 
clear increase in the influence of oil prices shocks on PPI. Finally, in the two samples, 
variances of nominal exchange rates are mainly explained by oil shocks at long horizon. Such 
evolution mirrors the growing dependence of many East Asian countries to oil since the end 
of 1990’s. The recent sub sample period has been marked by a dramatic increase in the oil 
price which has definitively exacerbated transmission effects of oil price on domestic 
variables especially in open economies as most East Asian countries. The increase in the 
sensitivity of domestic variables to oil shocks is very  important in countries bearing a 
dramatic deterioration of their net oil trade balances (exports minus imports) since the end of 
1990s’: Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, and China. 
In the major part of our studied countries, U.S. GDP shocks explain a lower share of domestic 
GDP variances than oil prices shocks over the all-period sample. The sub-period sample 
shows that the influence of U.S. GDP shocks decreases in many East Asian countries for all 
horizons. Such evolutions are consistent with two major changes that have occuredin the 
international trade of our sample’s countries.First, since the beginning of 90’s, intra-regional 
trade has increasedat the expense of the trade with the United States. The main part of the 
decline in U.S. share has occured after 2000. The second major change in the region has been 
the growing trade influence of China both at the worldwide level and regional one. If the 
weight of China in the total intra-regional trade has increased since the beginning of the 
1980’s, we note a major acceleration after 2000 for exports. The higher share of China in 
intra-regional trade has been accompanied by an increasing role of China in the East Asian 
countries trade with other areas, particularly the United States.At the same time, trade 
composition has changed in East Asia. On the one hand, the share of parts and components in 
total trade has increased. On the other hand, trade integration has been accompanied by a 
growing similarity in the commodity composition of exports, except for Indonesia  (Petri, 
2006; Guillaumin, 2009; Allegret and Essaadi, 2011).These evolutions suggest an increasing 
indirect influence of U.S.  GDP shocks via  the role of China in the region. From this 
perspective, Allegret and Essaadi (2011) find that total intra-regional imports of China are 
cointegrated with the U.S. GDP, confirming this indirect influence. Variances of producer 
prices and nominal exchange rates are weakly explained by U.S. GDP shocks in the two 
samples. The finding relative to exchange rate could be explained by the tendancy of East   11 
Asian economies to monitor exchange rates within the region and attempts to keep the relative 
value of their currencies in line with the value of selected regional currencies. These 
“competitive” adjustments in exchange rates are allegedly made so as to maintain the 
competitiveness of their exports on globalmarkets. 
International monetary shocks (Fed funds disturbances) and international financial shocks 
(MSCI disturbances) exert the weakest influence on domestic variables in most of our studied 
countries. This result holds whatever the sample period and is in accordance with recent 
litterature on this issue (Maćkowiak, 2007; Moneta and Rüffer, 2009; Gimet, 2011). Despite 
recent progress, East Asian countries  –  except Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore  –  still 
exhibit  low financial openness index  (Pongsaparn and Unteroberdoerster, 2011). More 
precisely, using the Chinn and Ito’s country ranking, in 2009, over a total number of 169 





sd), South Korea (90




th), and Thailand (111
th).
16 As a result, it’s doubtful that financial 
openness can explain the higher influence of external factors on domestic variables variances. 
Using a de facto measure of international financial integration does not qualitatively change 
this result. In 2007, only Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia had a ratio (Stock of 
external assets + Stock of external liabilities) / GDP higher than the unweighted average of 
emerging countries.
17
4. The impact of external shocks on domestic variables 
 
 
Dynamic responses of each domestic variable to the different external shocks are depicted 
respectively in figures C.1 to C.4and C.5 to C.8for the all-period sample and the sub-period 
sample respectively. Tracing out the time paths of the effects of pure shocks on the set of 
domestic variables, impulse responses allow us to analyze not only the contemporaneous 
reaction to a specific shock but also the speed of adjustment of the economy. The extent to 
which initial responses and adjustment differ gives some information on the feasibility of a 
monetary union. 
Real oil price shock should  negatively affect macroeconomic variables through different 
transmission channels. First of all, such shock induces a supply-side shock effect in which 
                                                 
16 Source: The Chinn-Ito Index, a de jure classification of financial openness. Results are similar if we take 2007 
as the reference year. 
17 Authors’ estimations, relying on the updated and extended database of the External Wealth of Nations Mark II 
database as described in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).   12 
firms bear an increase in their marginal producing costs. Second, oil price shocks are followed 
by wealth transfer effect from net-importing countries to net-exporting ones. Finally, as 
stressed by Bernanke et al. (1997), a positive innovation in real oil price is followed by a 
restrictive monetary policy in order to fight inflationary pressure. Such monetary policy 
response may exert a negative influence on economic activity. Tang et al. (2010) find that 
since 2003 a positive oil price shock has been followed by a tight monetary policy in China. 
These transmission channels suggest an expected negative response of GDP in the aftermath 
of a positive oil price shock at least in net oil-importing countries. However, our results, in 
case of responses stastically significant, lead to an opposite relationship: in all studied 
countries, a positive real oil price shock increases the GDP. The shock is long-lived in all 
countries, except for South Korea and Singapore. The adjustment of GDP occurs well beyond 
five quarters. Our results are consistent with Kilian (2009: 1054) who distinguishes different 
types of oil shocks: oil supply shocks (driven by pressures on the current physical availability 
of crude oil), precautionary demand shocks (explained by a significant change in the 
precautionary demand for oil) and aggregate demand shocks (driven by the global business 
cycle). While the two first shocks may lead to negative response of economic activity, the 
latter may lead to a positive one. Since the end of 90’s, oil prices shocks are mainly driven by 
demand shocks. As a result, taking into account the role played by exports in the rate of 
growth of East Asian economies, the increase in oil prices has been mainly originated by a 
higher growth in advanced countries that, in turn, has lead to an increase in exports and then 
in the revenue of Asian countries.
18
In all countries except for the Philippines (in the all-period sample), domestic currencies have 
appreciated in the aftermath of the oil shocks. Such result is not surprising for the main oil 
exporting economies in the region (Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia). For other countries, 
the appreciation may rest on the positive relationship between oil prices increases and world 
The sub-period sample confirms the previous findings. 
However, for many countries, we note both stronger responses on impact of the oil shocks 
and fluctuations of GDP. 
As expected, in all countries and for the two samples, domestic production prices increase 
after the real oil prices shocks. It is important to stress that responses of PPI are similar across 
our studied countries both in terms of contemporaneous reactions and persistence. 
                                                 
18 For instance, as the main engine of growth in the area, recall that Chinese export to European Union-27 and 
the United States amount to around 38 percent of its total exports (WTO, 2009). At the same time, oil demand 
from the United States and OECD Europe account for 40 percent of the world demand (US Department of 
Energy, EIA, 2010).   13 
growth. Indeed, East Asian countries can reap the benefits of a higher regional GDP in terms 
of higher export revenues which in turn exert an upward pressure on the NER. 
As a proxy of economic activity in advanced countries, we expect a positive response of 
domestic GDP to a positive innovation on U.S. GDP. Indeed, the high trade openness degree 
of East Asian countries makes them very sensitive to the trade channel. This procyclical 
reaction is verified in all studied countries. However, the size of the GDP responses to the 
U.S.  GDP shocks remains narrow.  The sub-period sample does not qualitatively change 
results, even if responses of domestic GDP to U.S. GDP shock are less accentuated. This 
result confirms the decreasing direct influence of the United States, and, more generally, of 
advanced countries, in the business cycles fluctuations of Asian economies (Kose and Prasad, 
2010).In the two samples, U.S. GDP shocks do not exert a significant economic influence on 
domestic prices. As East Asian countries have high levels of productive capacity, supply 
effects may be predominant relative to demand ones on prices behaviour, explaining this 
weak influence.Finally, positive U.S.  GDP shocks are followed by an appreciation of 
domestic currencies (except in China for the all-period sample). Indeed, Asian countries 
benefit from an increase in exports that, in turn, improves their growth performance and then 
tend to appreciate their currencies.However, in all cases, responses are short-lived. Similar 
results are obtained in the sub-period sample. Overall, U.S.  GDP  shock exerts  a weak 
influence on nominal exchange rates in the region. 
In the all-period sample, GDP responses to the external monetary shock are either 
insignificant from a statistical standpoint or short-lived. The sub-period sample accentuates 
this finding. Only the Philippines exhibit a consistent negative response to Fed Funds shocks. 
The responses of GDP in other countries suggest that the U.S. monetary policy does not exert 
a significant impact on economic activity in East Asian countries.  In the two samples, 
domestic prices and nominal exchange rates are weakly affected by Fed Funds shocks. This 
result mirrors the weak influence of U.S. monetary policy on the economic activity in the 
region. In addition, concerning the exchange rates, our result  is  in  line  with  Maćkowiak 
(2007) who finds significant responses only at very short-term. 
The external financial shock does not seem to exert a significant impact on domestic GDP and 
prices in the region, even in the sub-period sample. In other words, despite progress in the 
financial deepening in East and South-East Asian countries since the end 90s’, wealth effects 
remain weak in these economies. The only exceptions  are the more financial developed 
countries – such as Japan and Singapore – where positive innovations on MSCI are followed 
by a short-lived increase in GDP. Nominal exchange rates  are  weakly  affected by the   14 
international  financial shock.The short-term responses are insignificant in many countries 
except Indonesia and South Korea where the NER depreciates.Overall, these last results 
confirm the relative low exposition of East Asian economies to financial shocks mainly 
explained by their relative low financial openness. 
 
5.  Correlationsof Domestic Variables Responses to 
External Shocks 
Recent developments in the European Monetary Union have shown that a key criterion for the 
success of a monetary union is that the responses of external shocks which hit the economies 
should be reasonably well correlated. In order to investigate more deeply  this issue, we 
calculate the correlations of domestic variables responses to external shocks, following the 
work of Agenor et al. (1999) and Canova  (2005). Indeed, positive correlations can be 
interpreted as reflecting symmetric responses while negative or not statistically different from 
zero correlations will reflect asymmetric  reponses.Correlations of domestic variables 
responses to external shocks are depicted respectively in tables D.1 to D.3 and D.4 to D.6 for 
the all-period sample and the sub-period sample respectively. 
The two samples exhibit a contrasting picture concerning the correlation of GDP responses to 
real oil prices shock. More precisely, even if correlations are positive for many pairs of 
countries in the all-period sample (for instance Indonesia-China; Malaysia-Indonesia; 
Philippines-Hong Kong), no clear trend emerges. The sub-period sample offers a more 
coherent picture. More precisely, two sub-groups are distinguished. First, New industrialized 
economies  (NIEs)  –  Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea  –  tend to have higher 
correlations between them and also with China. Second, countries from the ASEAN have 
higher bilateral correlations of GDP responses to oil shock. Globally speaking, the degree of 
correlation of GDP responses to U.S. GDP shock is close to that found forthe oil price shock. 
Except the Philippines, countries whose trade specialization is founded on manufactures are 
especially correlated  with other countries inthe region  (China, Japan, Hong Kong, South 
Korea). These symmetric responses suggest that more advanced countries in the region tend 
to transmit U.S. GDP shocks to other economies and confirm the indirect influence exerted by 
the United States. Correlations of GDP responses to the international monetary policy shock 
are very different in the two samples. In the sub-period sample, we see a striking decrease in 
the number of symmetric responses mainly explained by China and Hong Kong. Thisdecrease   15 
stems from the move of exchange rate regimes towards higher flexibility
19
In the two samples, responses of nominal exchange rates (NER) to real oil price shocks are 
the most correlated. Such result is consistent with the increasing oil dependence of the region. 
In addition, as stressed above, South-East Asian oil exporters have strong relationships with 
other countries in the region. While China is an outlier in the all-period sample, this country 
appears significantly more correlated with other economies in the sub-period sample. This 
, whileChina and 
Hong Kong have kept their rigid exchange rate regime. The sub-period sample shows an even 
greater decrease in the degree of symmetry of the GDP responses to the international financial 
shock. This result is consistent with the low degreeof international financial integration found 
in the region. In addition, recurrent changes in capital controls measures since the Asian crisis 
in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand have certainly exerted a 
negative impact on this degree of symmetry. 
In the two samples, domestic prices responses to real oil prices shock tend to be symmetric 
for the major part of our studied countries.  China  and  Hong Kong are  outliers. Higher 
correlations are observed in oil exporting countries with major oil importing countries. From 
this perspective, real oil prices shocks create interdepencies in the region.Tables D.2 and D.5 
display few symmetric responses of domestic prices to the U.S.  GDP shocks  in the two 
samples. We observe some pairwises of positive correlations (especially for Malaysia and 
Thailand in the all-period sample; and Singapore in the sub-period one).  Responses of 
producer prices (PPI) to the Fed Funds shocks are weakly correlated in the two samples. More 
precisely, if we consider all external shocks and all responses correlations, we see that PPI 
responses to the external monetary shocks are in most cases asymmetric. In the two samples, 
more financially opened countries – Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea – tend to 
have more symmetric responses with other East Asian economies. External financial shocks 
exhibit lower positive correlations of PPI responses in the all-period sample. At the oppositve, 
responses appear much more symmetric over the period 1996Q1-2010Q4. Like the external 
monetary shock, responses to the external financial shock show that more financially opened 
countries have higher correlations with other economies.Overall, these results suggest that 
prices correlations have improved after 1996 in East Asian economies. 
                                                 
19In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, some countries moved towards more flexible arrangements 
(Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand) while others abided their exchange rate regimes (China 
(conventional peg), Hong Kong (hard peg), Singapore (managed floating) and Japan (floating regime). Malaysia 
exhibits a more contrasting evolution: immediately after the Asian crisis the authorities adopted a floating 
regime, but, in the aftermath of the decision to control capital movements (September 1998), Malaysia moved 
towards a conventional peg until the end of 1999 when they chose intermediate regime. See: the Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s classification until 2007; the Bubula and Ötker-Robe’s classification until 2006; and the IMF’s Annual 
Report after 2008. All these sources are de facto classification.   16 
finding is consistent with changes in the prices controles strategy followed by Chinese 
authorities. As China met increasing difficulties to control raw material prices, from 1998 to 
2001, Chinese authorities implemented reforms liberalizing oil pricing system.
20
6. Conclusion 
  As a 
consequence, domestic oil prices are increasingly correlated tothe world market. In turn, this 
change inenergy prices strategy may have favouredan increasing symmetry in the responses 
of China vis-à-vis other East Asian countries. NER responses of U.S. GDP shocks show high 
correlation degrees in the two samples except for China. As stressed above, the fixed 
exchange rate regime and strict capital controls in this country may represent impediments to 
promote convergence towards neighbourings countries. New industrialized countries and 
ASEAN economies exhibit strong correlations. NER responses to the external monetary 
shock display more positive correlations in the all-period sample than in the sub-period one. 
Such result is surprising if we consider the convergence of many studied countries towards 
more flexible exchange rate arrangements after 2000. The comparison of the two samples 
suggests that the decrease in the correlation degrees over the period 1996Q1-2010Q4 may be 
explained by countries with extreme regimes (China and Hong Kong on the one hand; Japan 
and Singapore on the other hand) which are consistently less positively correlated with other 
economies in the region.This finding suggests that the move towards more flexible regimes 
occurs inside intermediate regimes. The external financial shock induces especially weak 
symmetric responses of NER in the two samples, revealing a weak influence of financial 
variables on nominal exchange rates. 
 
The aim of this paper was to quantify the importance of a broad set of external shocks in 
domestic variables fluctuations for a sample of East Asian countries. In this respect,it extends 
the literature in several dimensions. By considering the impact of abroad set of exogenous 
shocks on East Asian economies  in a unified framework, this paperfirstly  providesa 
comprehensive picture of the overall contribution of external shocks to the variances of 
domestic variables in these economies, and of the relative importance of each type ofshock. 
Finally, the existing papers that focus on East Asian had beenconcerned above all with the 
impact of trade orforeign interest rate shocks. We document in addition the dynamic response 
of domestic variables to financial stress in these economies.The general picture that emerges 
is that external shocksexert meaningful effects on domestic variables in East Asia, especially 
                                                 
20 For more details, see Tang et al. (2010) and Duaet al. (2010).   17 
in the most recent period. To the extent that these shocks cover the mostimportant external 
contingencies faced by East Asian countries, our results suggest that domestic variables are 
largely  more influenced by real external shocks than by  external monetary and financial 
shocks. 
Our results on variance decompositions and impulse responses functions show that East Asian 
countries appear especially sensitive to the trade channel. Correlations of responses of 
domestic variables to external shocks displaytwo main findings. Firstly, in the two period 
samples, responses to external real shocks are especially positively correlated. As these 
shocks are at the same time the most relevant for our studied countries, such symmetric 
responses make a monetary union suitable within the region. Japan and new industrialized 
countries  –  including China  –  are the main driving forces explaining such correlations. 
Secondly, in the sub-period sample, responses of domestic variables to external monetary and 
financial shocks are less symmetric,  thus justifying the  reinforcement  of monetary and 
financial  cooperation  between the area’s countries.  We attribute this result to a higher 
diversity in the exchange rate regimes in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, asKawai (2009) 
and Chow (2011) who stress the prevalence of diverse and uncoordinated exchange rate 
arrangements after the Asian financial crisis. In this respect, our findings alsoquestion the 
“China’s dominance hypothesis” (Fratzcher and Mehl, 2011; Ito, 2010)and the stabilizing role 
played bythe renminbi since mid-2000’s. In addition, there is no convergence in the monetary 
regimes in the region. For instance, the analysis of the correlations among inflation targeters 
countries
21
                                                 
21South Korea (January 2000); Thailand (May 2000); the Philippines (January 2002); and Indonesia (July 2005). 
Date of inflation targeting adoption in the brackets. 
 does not reveal a particular high degree of symmetry in the responses of domestic 
variables to external shocks. This leads us to a more nuanced position than Rose (2011) about 
the ability of inflation targeting to promote synchronization.   18 
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Appendix A 
Data description 
The data used in section 4 are quarterly, covering the period 1990Q1-2009Q4. The sample 
includes the following countries: China, South Korea, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam 
were removed from the sample because of the lack of available data. 
GDP (or, if unavailable, industrial production) data, producer price index  and  nominal 
exchange rates come from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Oil price matches the 
Brent oil price taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the database of 
EIA (Energy Information Administration). Real oil price is obtained by deflating oil price 
using the World GDP deflator taken from the World Bank database. The U.S. short-term 
interest rate (Fed Funds) comes from the database of Saint-Louis’ Fed. MSCI index comes 
from the Datastream database. 
Each of the estimated SVAR model includes a dummycrisis variable so as to consider the 
Asian crisis. Introducing such a variable allows us to control aberrant points. Its value is set to 
1 for quarters 1997Q2 and 1998Q3, and to 0 the rest of the time. We also introduce a dummy 
variable which equal to 1 from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2 and 0 otherwise in order to take into 
account the effects of the world crisis started with the subprime crisis.   22 
Appendix B 
Decomposition of Variance 
Table B.1: the fraction of the variance of the GDP due to external shocks. 1990Q1-2010Q4 
Shock    Horizon    China    Korea    Hong Kong    Indonesia    Japan    Malaysia    Philippines    Singapore    Thailand 
Oil price    1-4    2.48    7.22    25.93    0.51    46.53    4.19    7.56    4.49    4.70 
    16-20    31.44    12.51    42.32    1.87    59.83    11.58    11.25    2.89    24.37 
U.S.gdp    1-4    15.2    2.54    8.26    2.53    4.67    10.02    0.38    5.95    10.19 
    16-20    6.41    10.17    7.81    2.48    2.34    18.34    11.20    30.87    4.42 
FedFunds    1-4    0.04    0.31    0.41    0.09    2.20    0.16    18.84    2.50    0.80 
    16-20    2.47    1.97    1.30    0.02    13.13    0.57    21.26    1.24    0.89 
MSCI index    1-4    0.29    1.91    2.23    2.21    5.38    15.21    1.21    7.02    0.97 
    16-20    3.90    0.81    1.45    4.26    4.53    3.49    1.31    3.21    5.26 
Sum    1-4    18.01    11.98    36.82    5.34    58.77    29.58    27.99    19.96    19.66 
    16-20    44.22    25.46    52.87    8.64    79.84    33.98    45.03    38.2    34.93 
Notes: ‘‘1–4’’ stands for the average between 1 quarter after a shock and 4 quarters after a shock. ‘‘16–20’’ stands for the average between 16 quarters after a shock and 20 quarters 
after a shock. 
 
Table B.2: the fraction of the variance of PPI due to external shocks. 1990Q1-2010Q4 
Shock    Horizon    China    Korea    Hong Kong    Indonesia    Japan    Malaysia    Philippines    Singapore    Thailand 
Oil price    1-4    15.75    24.58    27.03    24.21    53.70    59.33    26.68    77.79    46.35 
    16-20    38.53    58.61    89.61    45.70    92.80    90.12    78.57    93.81    85.34 
U.S. gdp    1-4    0.05    0.04    0.94    1.34    1.36    0.17    1.14    0.40    0.24 
    16-20    4.49    1.58    0.36    9.76    0.35    0.50    1.33    0.39    0.55 
FedFunds    1-4    2.13    0.27    0.09    0.16    0.05    0.02    1.46    0.05    0.05 
    16-20    22.14    0.73    0.62    0.32    0.82    0.09    0.31    0.42    0.84 
MSCI index    1-4    10.75    10.20    8.58    1.03    9.24    0.75    3.69    0.69    2.47 
    16-20    14.83    10.93    1.26    3.53    2.81    0.59    1.28    0.15    0.38 
Sum    1-4    28.68    35.09    36.65    26.75    64.34    60.27    32.97    78.93    49.11 
    16-20    79.98    91.85    71.65    59.30    96.77    91.3    81.49    94.77    87.11 
Notes: ‘‘1–4’’ stands for the average between 1 quarter after a shock and 4 quarters after a shock. ‘‘1–8’’ stands for the average between the first quarter after a shock and 8 quarters 
after a shock. ‘‘8–16’’ stands for the average between 8 quarters after a shock and 16 quarters after a shock. ‘‘16–20’’ stands for the average between 16 quarters after a shock and 
20 quarters after a shock.   23 
 
Table B.3: the fraction of the variance of NER due to external shocks. 1990Q1-2010Q4 
Shock    Horizon    China    Korea    Hong Kong    Indonesia    Japan    Malaysia    Philippines    Singapore    Thailand 
Oil price    1-4    5.47    14.59    4.26    3.93    0.57    5.87    10.74    21.26    0.22 
    16-20    9.63    69.65    21.08    34.43    57.95    81.43    13.11    57.35    70.20 
U.S. gdp    1-4    1.62    5.06    2.54    1.71    0.01    1.95    13.36    1.59    1.17 
    16-20    1.90    3.88    6.45    8.62    0.19    4.86    10.11    1.33    5.10 
FedFunds    1-4    2.25    5.09    0.58    0.44    0.89    0.36    0.73    0.19    4.35 
    16-20    22.17    2.37    2.32    0.37    7.88    0.17    2.67    0.22    1.37 
MSCI index    1-4    0.19    1.15    0.73    1.39    0.16    0.69    1.41    1.68    0.65 
    16-20    13.21    1.37    0.65    3.39    4.65    0.24    0.73    0.74    0.69 
Sum    1-4    9.53    25.90    8.11    7.46    1.63    8.87    26.25    24.72    6.29 
    16-20    46.92    77.27    30.50    46.81    70.66    86.70    26.62    59.65    77.36 
 
Notes: ‘‘1–4’’ stands for the average between 1 quarter after a shock and 4 quarters after a shock. ‘‘16–20’’ stands for the average between 16 quarters after a shock and 20 quarters 
after a shock. 
 
Table B.4: the fraction of the variance of the GDP due to external shocks. 1996Q1-2010Q4 
Shock    Horizon    China    Korea    Hong Kong    Indonesia    Japan    Malaysia    Philippines    Singapore    Thailand 
Oil price    1-4    4.31    15.19    28.07    8.64    58.30    13.68    6.60    3.45    10.29 
    16-20    18.54    10.76    25.26    58.28    61.23    51.58    34.41    25.07    46.38 
U.S. gdp    1-4    5.58    1.33    4.20    0.78    2.94    17.71    0.26    12.39    12.57 
    16-20    5.30    7.89    1.80    0.33    1.25    9.39    0.85    29.84    2.34 
FedFunds    1-4    2.74    1.94    0.40    0.08    0.85    0.85    26.57    2.74    0.07 
    16-20    15.83    27.34    0.38    1.40    14.90    4.94    31.42    0.31    10.03 
MSCI index    1-4    4.17    0.37    0.21    6.36    6.45    6.50    5.55    3.13    5.05 
    16-20    24.02    1.71    1.49    2.98    7.08    1.33    4.88    0.75    3.65 
Sum    1-4    16.79    18.82    32.87    15.87    68.54    38.74    39.98    21.71    27.97 
    16-20    63.68    47.71    28.92    62.99    84.45    67.24    71.56    55.97    62.40 
 
Notes: ‘‘1–4’’ stands for the average between 1 quarter after a shock and 4 quarters after a shock. ‘‘16–20’’ stands for the average between 16 quarters after a shock and 20 quarters 
after a shock. 
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Table B.5: the fraction of the variance of PPI due to external shocks. 1996Q1-2010Q4 
Shock    Horizon    China    Korea    Hong Kong    Indonesia    Japan    Malaysia    Philippines    Singapore    Thailand 
Oil price    1-4    49.68    19.16    20.93    1.28    58.99    57.66    37.89    78.96    55.38 
    16-20    68.18    35.88    65.41    7.13    87.25    63.17    58.08    93.88    82.07 
U.S. gdp    1-4    0.31    0.85    3.48    1.40    1.90    0.48    0.87    1.06    0.79 
    16-20    0.27    3.66    0.63    41.79    0.37    9.52    7.88    0.79    0.57 
FedFunds    1-4    4.37    3.56    8.67    3.54    1.23    3.05    0.24    0.43    3.23 
    16-20    15.32    10.54    6.91    2.10    3.65    0.62    0.45    0.69    6.67 
MSCI index    1-4    6.05    21.28    17.72    7.05    13.61    3.17    3.56    0.07    2.45 
    16-20    6.92    24.80    7.22    7.98    4.62    4.89    6.50    0.03    0.95 
Sum    1-4    60.41    44.85    50.80    13.27    75.73    64.36    42.56    80.51    61.85 
    16-20    90.69    74.88    80.17    59.00    95.89    78.20    72.91    95.40    90.26 
 
Notes: ‘‘1–4’’ stands for the average between 1 quarter after a shock and 4 quarters after a shock. ‘‘16–20’’ stands for the average between 16 quarters after a shock and 20 quarters 
after a shock. 
 
Table B.6: the fraction of the variance of NER due to external shocks. 1996Q1-2010Q4 
Shock    Horizon    China    Korea    Hong Kong    Indonesia    Japan    Malaysia    Philippines    Singapore    Thailand 
Oil price    1-4    23.24    30.14    0.93    12.69    0.94    12.74    1.18    15.56    0.56 
    16-20    78.75    69.56    22.49    56.16    42.19    78.72    61.58    4.05    54.74 
U.S. gdp    1-4    0.93    3.07    1.55    1.68    11.55    2.43    6.44    3.50    2.45 
    16-20    0.17    1.93    4.14    11.29    3.65    5.04    2.07    3.93    1.76 
FedFunds    1-4    18.92    2.51    0.33    0.10    7.39    0.14    0.70    0.57    1.89 
    16-20    10.41    1.84    7.10    0.52    21.67    0.57    3.35    0.22    2.62 
MSCI index    1-4    2.93    2.73    0.62    3.00    3.77    2.74    6.36    2.29    0.48 
    16-20    1.56    2.41    1.50    2.72    12.38    1.09    1.91    0.72    0.21 
Sum    1-4    46.02    38.45    3.44    17.46    23.65    18.05    14.68    21.92    5.38 
    8-16    83.65    67.60    20.18    59.91    75.14    78.61    47.01    10.17    30.83 
    16-20    90.89    75.73    35.24    70.69    79.88    85.43    68.91    8.92    59.34 
 
Notes: ‘‘1–4’’ stands for the average between 1 quarter after a shock and 4 quarters after a shock. ‘‘16–20’’ stands for the average between 16 quarters after a shock and 20 quarters 
after a shock.   25 
Appendix CImpulse Response Functions 
Table C.1: Impulse Response Functions to an oil shock – 1990Q1-2010Q4 
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Table C.2: Impulse Response Functions to an US GDP shock – 1990Q1-2010Q4 
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Table C.3: Impulse Response Functions to an US Monetary shock – 1990Q1-2010Q4 
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Table C.4: Impulse Response Functions to a MSCI Financial shock – 1990Q1-2010Q4 
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Table C.5: Impulse Response Functions to an oil shock – 1996Q1-2010Q4 
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Table C.6: Impulse Response Functions to an US GDP shock – 1996Q1-2010Q4 
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Table C.7: Impulse Response Functions to an US Monetary shock – 1996Q1-2010Q4 
       
  China  Korea  Hong Kong 
d y  
     
d p  
     
d n  
     
       
  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia 
d y  
     
d p  
     
d n  
     
       
  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
d y  
     
d p  
     
d n  
     
 
   















































































































































































































































0.050  32 
Table C.8: Impulse Response Functions to a MSCI Financial shock – 1996Q1-2010Q4 
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Appendix DCorrelations of domestic variables to external shocks 
Table D.1: correlation of y
d – 1990Q4-2010Q4 
Oil price  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.42  1               
Hong Kong  -0.59
*  -0.43  1             
Indonesia  0.91
***  -0.02  -0.85










***  -0.44  1       






















*  1 
U.S. gdp  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.74
**  1               
Hong Kong  0.92
***  -0.43  1             
Indonesia  0.31  0.37
*  0.64




***  -0.18  1         
Malaysia  0.17  0.45
**  0.52
***  0.93




***  -0.41  -0.78




**  0.16  -0.98
***  0.28  0.83
***  1   
Thailand  0.87






*  1 
Fed Funds  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  0.92
***  1               
Hong Kong  0.93
***  0.71
***  1             
Indonesia  -0.10  0.30  -0.45  1           
Japan  0.36
*  0.68
***  0.00  0.87




***  -0.07  0.39
**  1       
Philippines  0.37
*  0.00  0.69
***  -0.94
**  -0.72





*  -0.10  0.77
***  0.74




***  0.08  0.53
***  0.83
***  0.19  0.77
***  1 
MSCI index  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  0.50
***  1               
Hong Kong  0.78















***  1       
Philippines  -0.18  -0.94
**  0.47
**  -0.40  -0.51







***  -0.19  1   
Thailand  0.80
***  0.89





***  1 
Note: significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).The correlation coefficients were calculated over 20 quarters.   34 
 
Table D.2: correlation of p
d – 1990Q4-2010Q4 
Oil price  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.75
**  1               
Hong Kong  0.99
***  -0.70




**  1           
Japan  0.25  0.38
*  0.37
*  0.30  1         
Malaysia  -0.17  0.75
***  -0.06  0.68
***  0.90
***  1       
Philippines  -0.03  0.62
***  0.09  0.56
***  0.96
***  0.98





***  -0.15  0.29  0.13  1   
Thailand  0.27  0.37
*  0.39
**  0.28  1.00
***  0.89
***  0.95
***  -0.17  1 
U.S. gdp  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.97
***  1               
Hong Kong  0.99
***  -0.96















***  1       















***  0.00  -0.82
**  1 
Fed Funds  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.43  1               
Hong Kong  0.94
***  -0.67









***  1         
Malaysia  0.97
***  -0.46  0.89
***  -0.62
*  -0.94
**  1       
Philippines  -0.28  -0.74
**  0.03  -0.56
*  -0.09  -0.22  1     
Singapore  -0.77
**  -0.23  -0.51
*  -0.01  0.50
***  -0.74
**  0.82







***  -0.12  -0.66
**  1 
MSCI index  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  0.35
*  1               
Hong Kong  0.09  -0.90
**  1             
Indonesia  0.84
***  0.77











***  1       





**  1     
Singapore  -0.88
**  0.07  -0.49  -0.50








***  1 
Note: significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).The correlation coefficients were calculated over 20 quarters. 
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Table D.3: correlation of n
d – 1990Q4-2010Q4 
Oil price  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.90
**  1               
Hong Kong  -0.94
**  0.99







































***  1 
U.S. gdp  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.86
**  1               
Hong Kong  -0.81
**  0.96




***  1           










***  0.08  0.99





***  0.19  0.99
***  0.98





***  0.08  1.00
***  0.99
***  0.99
***  1 
Fed Funds  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.95
***  1               
Hong Kong  -0.99
***  0.89














***  -0.16  1       
Philippines  0.19  -0.01  -0.33  0.18  -0.83
**  0.62





***  0.03  0.98
***  0.49





***  0.15  0.94
***  0.40
**  0.99
***  1 
MSCI index  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.27  1               
Hong Kong  -0.97
***  0.11  1             
Indonesia  -0.16  0.98
***  -0.02  1           
Japan  -0.85
**  -0.16  0.85
***  0.30  1         
Malaysia  -0.42  0.98
***  0.28  0.95
***  -0.05  1       
Philippines  0.94
***  -0.02  -0.99
***  0.10  -0.85
**  -0.20  1     
Singapore  0.92
***  -0.07  -0.98
***  0.04  -0.76
**  -0.25  0.99
***  1   
Thailand  0.83
***  0.18  -0.94
**  0.29  -0.80
**  0.00  0.97
***  0.97
***  1 
Note: significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).The correlation coefficients were calculated over 20 quarters. 
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Table D.4: correlation of y
d – 1996Q4-2010Q4 
Oil price  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  0.51
***  1               
Hong Kong  0.54









**  1         
Malaysia  -0.92
**  -0.29  -0.67
**  0.86
***  -0.86















***  1   
Thailand  -0.97






**  1 
U.S. gdp  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.37  1               
Hong Kong  0.99




***  1           
Japan  0.09  -0.92
**  0.00  0.33
*  1         
Malaysia  0.71
***  -0.16  0.77
***  0.83
***  -0.22  1       
Philippines  -0.04  0.94
***  0.01  -0.45  -0.95






**  -0.48  0.65







***  -0.48  -0.97
***  1 
Fed Funds  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.97
***  1               
Hong Kong  0.49
**  -0.63




*  1           
Japan  0.00  0.20  -0.75
**  0.05  1         
Malaysia  -0.97
***  0.88
***  -0.31  0.95
***  -0.21  1       
Philippines  0.23  -0.44  0.92
***  -0.29  -0.89
**  0.00  1     
Singapore  -0.92
**  0.83
***  -0.38  0.90
***  -0.08  0.96





***  0.30  0.84
***  -0.54
*  0.83
***  1 
MSCI index  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.78
**  1               
Hong Kong  0.97
***  -0.88




***  1           
Japan  0.32  0.10  0.11  -0.03  1         
Malaysia  0.17  0.33  -0.05  0.17  0.96











**  0.26  0.79





***  0.12  0.30  -0.95
***  -0.79
**  1 
Note: significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).The correlation coefficients were calculated over 20 quarters. 
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Table D.5: correlation of p
d – 1996Q4-2010Q4 
Oil price  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  0.98
***  1               
Hong Kong  -0.77
**  -0.74
**  1             
Indonesia  0.44
**  0.28  -0.49  1           
Japan  0.70
***  0.82
***  -0.39  -0.31  1         
Malaysia  0.34
*  0.19  -0.14  0.82




**  0.05  0.89






***  0.21  0.90
***  1   
Thailand  0.62
***  0.74
***  -0.43  -0.42  0.96
***  -0.43  0.88
***  0.59
***  1 
U.S. gdp  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.52
*  1               
Hong Kong  0.34
*  -0.37  1             
Indonesia  -0.62
*  0.97





**  1         
Malaysia  -0.61
*  0.78
***  0.10  0.89
***  -0.69












***  -0.40  -0.96









***  1 
Fed Funds  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  0.87
***  1               
Hong Kong  0.17  -0.28  1             
Indonesia  -0.01  0.41
**  -0.96
***  1           
Japan  0.15  0.54
***  -0.89
**  0.98
***  1         
Malaysia  -0.69
**  -0.42  -0.66
**  0.64
***  0.53






**  -0.19  1     
Singapore  -0.65




***  -0.30  1   
Thailand  0.58






***  1 
MSCI index  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  0.90
***  1               
Hong Kong  0.40
**  0.47




**  1           
Japan  0.93
***  0.97
***  0.29  0.98













**  1     
Singapore  0.36
*  0.23  -0.59
*  0.24  0.37
*  0.05  0.27  1   
Thailand  0.85
***  0.97





**  1 
Note: significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).The correlation coefficients were calculated over 20 quarters. 
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Table D.6: correlation of n
d – 1996Q4-2010Q4 
Oil price  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  0.26  1               
Hong Kong  0.78




***  1           
Japan  0.71
***  0.76
***  0.33  0.93






***  1       
Philippines  0.98




***  1     
Singapore  -0.94
**  0.07  -0.88
**  -0.73
**  -0.45  -0.87
**  -0.96
***  1   
Thailand  0.91






***  1 
U.S. gdp  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.47  1               
Hong Kong  -0.58
*  0.93




***  1           
Japan  -0.23  0.94
***  0.76
***  0.78






***  1       





***  1     
Singapore  -0.66
**  -0.28  0.00  0.02  -0.55
**  0.21  -0.47  1   







*  1 
Fed Funds  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.85
**  1               
Hong Kong  -0.91
**  0.96




***  1           
Japan  0.55





***  -0.31  1       
Philippines  0.15  -0.41  -0.50  -0.27  -0.71
**  -0.38  1     
Singapore  -0.52
*  0.25  0.18  0.40
**  -0.97
***  0.29  0.76







***  0.10  0.72
***  1 
MSCI index  China  Korea  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
China  1                 
Korea  -0.54  1               
Hong Kong  -0.66  0.98  1             
Indonesia  -0.70  0.98  0.99  1           
Japan  0.93  -0.56  -0.69  -0.68  1         
Malaysia  -0.50  0.96  0.96  0.92  -0.59  1       
Philippines  0.42  -0.78  -0.69  -0.78  0.25  -0.58  1     
Singapore  0.17  -0.50  -0.37  -0.48  -0.06  -0.25  0.92  1   
Thailand  -0.69  0.41  0.57  0.50  -0.87  0.57  0.13  0.48  1 
Note: significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).The correlation coefficients were calculated over 20 quarters. 
 